Papua New Guinea LNG Terminal

From Global Energy Monitor
This article is part of the Global Fossil Infrastructure Tracker, a project of Global Energy Monitor.
Sub-articles:

Papua New Guinea LNG Terminal, also known as PNG LNG, is an LNG terminal in National Capital District, Papua New Guinea, owned by a coalition of companies led by ExxonMobil. (The project is distinct from the TotalEnergies-led Papua LNG Terminal.)

Location

The LNG Plant is located 20 kilometres northwest of Port Moresby, at Caution Bay on the south coast of PNG’s Central Province.

Loading map...

Project Details

Trains 1 & 2

  • Operator: PNG LNG[1]
  • Owner: PNG LNG[2]
  • Parent company: ExxonMobil (33.2%), Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited (16.8%), Santos Limited (42.5%), ENEOS Holdings (4.7%), Government of Papua New Guinea (2.8%)[2]
    • Change in progress: ExxonMobil (33.2%), Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited (19.4%), Santos Limited (39.9%), ENEOS Holdings (4.7%), Government of Papua New Guinea (2.8%)[3]
  • Location: Port Moresby, National Capital District, Papua New Guinea
  • Coordinates: -9.33862, 147.01825 (exact)
  • Type: Export[4]
  • Capacity: 8.3 mtpa (4.15 mtpa per train)[5][1]
  • Cost: 4.5 billion USD[4]
  • Status: Operating[4]
  • Start Year: 2014[4][1]

Train 3

  • Operator: PNG LNG[1]
  • Owner: PNG LNG[1]
  • Parent company: Formerly: ExxonMobil (33.2%), Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited (16.8%), Santos Limited (42.5%), ENEOS Holdings (4.7%), Government of Papua New Guinea (2.8%)[2]
    • Change in progress: ExxonMobil (33.2%), Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited (19.4%), Santos Limited (39.9%), ENEOS Holdings (4.7%), Government of Papua New Guinea (2.8%)[3]
  • Location: Port Moresby, National Capital District, Papua New Guinea
  • Coordinates: -9.33862, 147.01825 (exact)
  • Type: Export[4]
  • Capacity: 2.6 mtpa[5]
  • Status: Cancelled[6]
  • Start Year: 2025[5]

Note: mtpa = million tonnes per year; bcfd = billion cubic feet per day

Background

The Papua New Guinea liquefied natural gas (LNG) project was constructed at a cost of US$19 billion. The project involves extracting natural gas from the Papua New Guinea highlands, where it is processed before being sent via some 700 kilometres of pipeline to the PNG LNG plant in Port Moresby. The gas is then liquefied and transferred into ships for sale offshore. Construction for the project began in 2010, and the first gas shipment was made in May 2014.[7]

The terminal has two trains with a capacity of 8.3 mtpa.[5]

According to ExxonMobil's InterOil, there is enough gas between the Elk-Antelope and P’nyang gas fields in Papua New Guinea to justify three LNG trains by 2023 to 2025, in addition to the existing two trains at PNG LNG.[8]

In July 2020, the Australian partner Oil Search disclosed that a majority of workers at the delayed expansion project have been idled due to adverse economic conditions brought on by COVID-19.[9]

Ownership changes

In August 2021, Santos Limited acquired Oil Search, granting Santos a 42.5% stake in the Papua New Guinea LNG project.[10][2]

In September 2022, Santos said that it had received a US$1.4 billion offer from Kumul Petroleum Holdings Limited for a 5% stake in the project.[11]

In August 2023, Santos and Kumul executed a binding sale agreement for a 2.5% stake sold from Santos to Kumul, with Santos maintaining a majority 39.9% stake.[3]

In February 2024, Santos and Kumul amended the terms of sale of the 2.6% stake: in January 2024 Kumul has paid $352 million to Santos, an equivalent of a 1.6 percent interest, to allow partial completion of the transaction, while the amendment provides additional time for Kumul to pay the remaining purchase price. Until final completion, Santos retains control of the entity holding the 2.6 percent.[12] Kumul has previously secured funding for the purchase in January 2024.[13] As of early June 2024, the sale did not appear to have been completed.

Train 3

A third train of 2.6 mtpa has been proposed but it was reported in February 2020 that talks between ExxonMobil and the government had broken down over the issue of profit-sharing.[5][14]

In April 2020, the energy and shipping brokerage Poten & Partners disclosed that the final investment decision (FID) for Train 3 had been delayed beyond the original FID timeframe of 2020-2021. It cited COVID-19, plunging demand and the crash in oil prices as the reasons for the delay.[15] It was previously reported, in February 2019, that the export credit agencies of Japan, South Korea, China and Australia were in discussions over the financing of the terminal's proposed expansion.[16] In 2010, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, China Exim Bank and Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Australia were all significant financial backers of Phase 1 of the project alongside commercial banks.[17]

In February 2021, it was reported that the partner companies were no longer working on adding a third train to the project and were instead interested in the Papua LNG Terminal.[6]

As of May 2024, there have not been any new developments related to this proposal and it is presumed to be cancelled.

Opposition

Landowners and communities displaced by the project were promised benefits such as income streams and infrastructure development. Few of these promises have been fulfilled, however; for example, the township of Komo contains a newly-built hospital building that has no beds, staff, or fuel for the building's generator.[7]

As a result, leaders of area communities organised to blockade the LNG facility by shutting off gas taps at several wells in August of 2016. Security guards attempted to stop the blockade, however, the leaders were armed. They then entered the plant site, locked site gates, and demanded the government honour original project agreements. Armed unrest over the project's failure to deliver agreed-upon benefits to the local population is ongoing.[7]

In January 2019 it was reported that royalty payments from the project to local residents have been much smaller than had been promised by the government.[18]

Articles and resources

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 The LNG Industry: GIIGNL Annual Report 2022. GIIGNL. May 2022.
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 About. PNG LNG. Accessed July 2022.
  3. 3.0 3.1 3.2 "https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/santos-sells-near-3-stake-png-lng-project-736-mln-2023-08-31/". {{cite web}}: External link in |title= (help)CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 "PNG Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project, Papua New Guinea," Hydrocarbons-Technology, accessed Aug 2017
  5. 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 "GIIGNL 2021 Annual Report”, page 43, GIIGNL, accessed May 4, 2021.
  6. 6.0 6.1 "No third train for PNG LNG, Oil Search says". LNGPrime. Feb 23, 2021. Retrieved May 28, 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  7. 7.0 7.1 7.2 "Papua New Guinea gets a dose of resource curse as ExxonMobil's natural gas project foments unrest," ABC News, March 9, 2017
  8. Dan Murtaugh and Sharon Cho, "PNG Government Prefers Exxon, Total Pursue 2nd LNG Project," Bloomberg, September 21, 2016
  9. Nathan Richardson, "Total, Exxon demobilize PNG LNG expansion workers due to COVID-19: Oil Search", S&P Global, Jul. 21, 2020
  10. Australia’s Santos to Gain Footholds in PNG LNG, Alaska with Oil Search Acquisition. Natural Gas Intel. August 2, 2021.
  11. Energy Voice. PNG offers Santos $1.4bn for 5% share of ExxonMobil-led PNG LNG. September 28, 2022.
  12. "Santos, Kumul amend PNG LNG deal". LNGPrime. Feb 1, 2024. Retrieved May 29, 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  13. "Kumul obtains funding to purchase PNG LNG stake from Santos". Offshore Energy. Jan 3, 2024. Retrieved May 29, 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  14. Papua New Guinea calls off talks with Exxon, Oil and Gas 360, Feb. 3, 2020
  15. John Snyder FID’s delayed by global uncertainty Riviera Maritime Media, Apr. 24, 2020
  16. Jonathan Bell Key LNG projects line up ECA financing TXF, Feb. 6, 2019
  17. PNG LNG Phase I IJGlobal, accessed May 27, 2020
  18. In Papua New Guinea, Exxon's giant LNG project fuels frustration, Reuters, Jan. 16, 2019

Related GEM.wiki articles

External resources

External articles