Sakhalin II LNG Terminal
| Part of the Global Gas Infrastructure Tracker, a Global Energy Monitor project. |
Sakhalin II LNG Terminal, also known as Prigorodnoye LNG export terminal, СПГ терминал Сахалин-2, and Производственный комплекс «Пригородное», is an LNG export terminal in Russia with units that are proposed and operating.
Location
Table 1: Location details
| Name | Location | Coordinates (WGS 84) |
|---|---|---|
| T1 | Prigorodnoye, Aniva Bay, Korsakovsky District, Sakhalin, Russia[1] | 46.6288, 142.9112 (exact) |
| T2 | Prigorodnoye, Aniva Bay, Korsakovsky District, Sakhalin, Russia[1] | 46.6288, 142.9112 (exact) |
| T3 | Prigorodnoye, Aniva Bay, Korsakovsky District, Sakhalin, Russia[1] | 46.6288, 142.9112 (exact) |
The map below shows the exact location of the terminal:
Project Details
Table 2: Infrastructure details
| Name | Facility type | Status | Capacity | Total terminal capacity | Offshore | Associated infrastructure |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | export[2] | operating[3][2][4][5][6] | 4.8 mtpa[7][3][8][9][10][11] | 15.0 mtpa | False | Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye oil and gas fields[12] |
| T2 | export[2] | operating[3][2][4][5][6] | 4.8 mtpa[7][3][8][9][10][11] | 15.0 mtpa | False | Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye oil and gas fields[12] |
| T3 | export[11] | proposed[7][13][14] | 5.4 mtpa[7][13][11] | 15.0 mtpa | False | Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye oil and gas fields[12] |
Table 3: Cost
| Name | Facility type | Cost | Total known terminal costs |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | export[2] | US$12,500,000,000[15][16] | US$25,000,000,000 |
| T2 | export[2] | US$12,500,000,000[15][16] | US$25,000,000,000 |
| T3 | export[11] | –[17] | US$25,000,000,000 |
Financing
No financing data available.
Table 4: Project timeline
| Name | Facility type | Status | Proposal year | FID year | Construction year | Operating year | Inactive year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | export[2] | operating[3][2][4][5][6] | – | – | 1998 | 2009[3][2][4][5][6] | – |
| T2 | export[2] | operating[3][2][4][5][6] | – | – | 1998 | 2009[3][2][4][5][6] | – |
| T3 | export[11] | proposed[7][13][14] | –[7][13][14] | 2008 (Pre-FID) | – | 2028[18][13] | – |
Ownership
Table 5: Ownership
| Name | Facility type | Status | Owners | Parent companies | Operator |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | export[2] | operating[3][2][4][5][6] | Sakhalin Energy LLC [100%][19][20][21] | Gazprom PJSC [77.5%]; Mitsui & Co Ltd [12.5%]; Mitsubishi Corp [10.0%] | Sakhalin Energy[19][21] |
| T2 | export[2] | operating[3][2][4][5][6] | Sakhalin Energy LLC [100%][19][20][21] | Gazprom PJSC [77.5%]; Mitsui & Co Ltd [12.5%]; Mitsubishi Corp [10.0%] | Sakhalin Energy[19][21] |
| T3 | export[11] | proposed[7][13][14] | Sakhalin Energy LLC [100%][19][20][21] | Gazprom PJSC [77.5%]; Mitsui & Co Ltd [12.5%]; Mitsubishi Corp [10.0%] | Sakhalin Energy[19][21] |
Background
At a cost of over US$25 billion, this project includes three large offshore platforms, 165 kilometers of subsea pipelines to shore, 800 kilometers of onshore pipeline, one of the world’s largest LNG plants, and oil and gas export terminals.[22] The project is supplied by the Piltun Astokhskoye Oil Field (Russia) and Lunskoye Oil and Gas Fields (Russia).[23]
The design capacity with Trains 1 and 2 is 9.6. million tonnes per annum. However, in 2025, LNG production at Sakhalin-2 reached 10.3 million tonnes,[24] which indicates the facility is operating above its nameplate capacity.
Ownership changes
In February 2022, in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Shell announced it would exit all of its Russian operations, including Sakhalin-2 in 2022.[25]
In April 2022, it was reported that Shell was discussing the sale of its 27.5% stake in the project with the Chinese state-run oil companies CNOOC Ltd, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and Sinopec, although all of the companies refused to comment on the speculation.[26] Citing energy security reasons, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said in March 2022 that Japan would not be withdrawing from the project in which Mitsui and Mitsubishi have 12.5% and 10% stakes respectively.[27]
In July 2022, Shell was reportedly assessing the implications of a Russian decree that would allow the Russian state to take over foreign companies' stakes in the project.[28]
Putin's decree dated June 30, 2022, transferred the Sakhalin II LNG project from the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company to Sakhalin Energy LLC in August 2022.[29][30] Japanese companies Mitsui and Mitsubishi decided to keep their shares in the project, while Shell's share was transferred to Novatek.[31][32]
In March 2024, Shell's 27.5% stake in the project was acquired by Sakhalin Project, fully owned by Gazprom, and the previous sale to Novatek was annulled.[33]
Trains 1 & 2
In 2015, Sakhalin-2 LNG exported more than 500 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas; 72% went to Japan, 24% to South Korea, 2% to Taiwan, and 2% to China.[34]
In 2024, Sakhalin Energy LLC shipped approximately 10.2 million tonnes of LNG from the port of Prigorodnoye. LNG shipments were carried out using three long-term chartered ice-class LNG carriers and additional vessels chartered by buyers. To ensure delivery of the full production volume, the company also chartered two additional LNG carriers on a short-term basis. In terms of exports, Japan accounted for 56.4% of Sakhalin-2 LNG exports, China — 27.8%, and South Korea — 15.8%.[35]
Train 3
The company proposed a capacity expansion by adding a third train. As of 2017, it had not yet reached a final investment decision.[36]
International Gas Union reported in 2017 that a third liquefaction and purification train at Sakhalin LNG has been delayed in part by sanctions imposed against the development of the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye natural gas field, which was to feed to Sakhalin.[36] In July 2019 Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Shell CEO Ben Van Buerden to secure additional investments by Shell in Russia, after which Shell announced a plan to build 260 additional gas stations, but did not announce further commitments to a Sakhalin II expansion.[37]
In September 2019, the cost of train 3 was estimated to be 6.1 billion USD.[38] In November 2019, Reuters reported that the plans for the third line have been put on hold, citing a lack of gas resources as well as the international sanctions imposed on Russia as the main reasons.[39] In May 2021, Gazprom's representative stated that "the project for the construction of the third line of the Sakhalin-2 project is at a high stage of development".[40]
As of May 2024, there have not been any development updates related to this project since May 2021; however, since the start year of this project is after 2027, this project is still considered proposed.[41]
In October 2024, Sakhalin Energy LLC confirmed its plans to build the third LNG production train for the Sakhalin II project. According to the company, the decision depended not on former foreign partners, but on securing sufficient gas resources to support both current operations and future expansion.[42]
Train 3 of the Sakhalin II LNG Terminal was not mentioned in the "Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2050", released by the Ministry of Energy of Russia in April 2025. According to the document, the LNG terminal will be operating with the capacity of 9.6 mtpa.[43] As of June 2025, there have not been any further updates about the project.
Environmental and Social Impacts
The impacts of the Sakhalin II LNG terminal include but are not limited to the following:
- In 2004 civil society groups raised concerns over the threat the project poses to the critically endangered Western Grey Whale.[44] Sakhalin Energy has failed to follow many of the recommendations of the Western Gray Whale Advisory Panel (WGWAP), violating a condition of several public and private lenders. [22]
- On 8 September 2004, a Sakhalin II-contracted dredging vessel ran aground on rocks at Kholmsk, Sakhalin Island, spilling approximately 1,300 barrels of fuel oil along 5 kilometers of coast. It was 48 hours before booms were in place to contain the spill.[45]
- In January 2005, local indigenous peoples’ groups began public protests against Sakhalin II.[44][46]
- Severe violations of pipeline construction requirements for Sakhalin II were recorded. Reckless construction included pipelines slashing through forests and polluting streams.[44][47]
- In August 2004, the Shell-led Sakhalin Energy Company announced the prohibition of salmon fishing in waters bordering the construction site of LNG plant in Sakhalin Island's Aniva Bay. The decision led local fishermen to protest by blocking the LNG factory road with cars loaded with fishing nets.[44][46]
- 800 km of the project’s onshore pipelines created severe erosion damaging hundreds of wild salmon rivers and tributaries and threatens future damage from poorly designed crossing of manifold geohazards, including 22 active earthquake fault crossings and landslide-prone areas.[22]
- LNG terminal dredging and the dumping of dredging wastes damaged the fisheries in Aniva Bay.[22]
- Associated construction activities disrupted local fishermen’s and fishing companies’ activities, adversely affecting the quality and quantity of fish caught, leading fishermen to bring a claim to the Independent Recourse Mechanism of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 2005.[22]
- After a massive die-off of herring in 1999 at Piltun Bay, independent lab tests conducted by environmental groups showed herring contained pollutants of the kind used in Sakhalin II drilling.[22]
- The project poses long-term risks of oil spills amidst treacherous weather and ice despite the fact that the oil industry, including Sakhalin Energy, has no successful experience of responding to oil spills in ice conditions.[22]
Articles and Resources
Additional data
To access additional data, including an interactive map of LNG terminals, a downloadable dataset, and summary data, please visit the Global Gas Infrastructure Tracker on the Global Energy Monitor website.
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 https://www.google.com/maps/place//@46.6288037,142.9086197,714m/data=!3m1!1e3!4m6!1m5!3m4!2zNDbCsDM3JzQzLjciTiAxNDLCsDU0JzQwLjMiRQ!8m2!3d46.6288!4d142.9112!5m1!1e2?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI1MDYwMS4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 2.00 2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.10 2.11 2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15 http://bit.ly/2mKKVVX.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 (PDF) https://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/iblock/d6a/Energostrategiya-RF-do-2050-goda.pdf.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 (PDF) https://giignl.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/GIIGNL2022_Annual_Report_May24.pdf.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 (PDF) https://giignl.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/GIIGNL-2025-Annual-Report-1-1.pdf.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2025/04/15/1104353-novatek-dolzhen-zapustit-tri-proekta-po-szhizheniyu-gaza.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 https://www.igu.org/igu-reports/2025-world-lng-report?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=22570706637&gbraid=0AAAAA9kOlQjyt6hUkZGX_RurEkcHXmNXD&gclid=CjwKCAjwi-DBBhA5EiwAXOHsGaWVYYsRaJy3-JGSjWw0q0CXTzrVa1-hCgvxwPR541313mP7dAIk5RoCum0QAvD_BwE.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 8.0 8.1 https://neftegaz.ru/news/spg-szhizhennyy-prirodnyy-gaz/819688-v-2023-g-proizvodstvo-spg-na-proekte-sakhalin-2-prevysilo-10-mln-t/.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 9.0 9.1 https://www.interfax.ru/business/883291.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 10.0 10.1 (PDF) https://giignl.org/system/files/giignl_2021_annual_report_may4.pdf.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 http://www.gasprocessingnews.com/news/russias-gazprom-plans-to-launch-third-lng-train-at-sakhalin-2-in-2021.aspx.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 https://www.finmarket.ru/news/6260965.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 https://rg.ru/2023/07/04/urovnem-pozhizhe.html.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 https://www.finmarket.ru/news/6261044.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 15.0 15.1 https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/3390/.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 16.0 16.1 https://www.reuters.com/article/shell-russia/update-2-russias-putin-offers-surprise-deal-to-shell-idUSLR10355520090627.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ https://www.interfax.ru/business/677628.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ https://gasprocessingnews.com/news/russias-gazprom-plans-to-launch-third-lng-train-at-sakhalin-2-in-2021.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 19.0 19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4 19.5 https://oilcapital.ru/news/2023-06-21/mitsui-poka-ostaetsya-2962060.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 20.0 20.1 20.2 https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/gazproms-unit-buys-former-shell-stake-in-sakhalin-energy-for-$1-bln.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.4 21.5 . 2023-04-12 https://web.archive.org/web/20231101131644/https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-novatek-acquire-shells-stake-sakhalin-2-116-bln-2023-04-12/. Archived from the original on 2023-11-01. Retrieved 2024-05-15.
{{cite web}}: Missing or empty|title=(help) - ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5 22.6 Ong, D (2011). "Transnational investment law and environmental protection: Russian state intervention in the Sakhalin II project - the empire strikes back?". irep.ntu.ac.uk. doi:10.1017/S0165070X11100017. Retrieved 2023-06-27.
- ↑ "Sakhalin-2 – an overview". www.shell.com. Retrieved 2022-06-28.
- ↑ "LNG production at Sakhalin-2 increases 1% to 10.3 mln tonnes in 2025 - regional authorities". Interfax. March 11, 2026. Retrieved June 15, 2026.
- ↑ "Japan-backed Sakhalin-2 LNG project rocked by Shell exit". Nikkei Asia. Retrieved 2022-06-28.
- ↑ Radhika Anilkumar, Muyu Xu, Chen Aizhu, "Shell in talks with Chinese firms to sell stake in Russian gas project - The Telegraph," Reuters, Apr. 22, 2022
- ↑ Kantaro Komiya, Kiyoshi Takenaka, "Japan will not abandon Sakhalin-2 LNG stake, PM Kishida says," Reuters, Mar. 31, 2022
- ↑ Staff, LNG Prime (2022-07-01). "Shell says assessing implications of Russia's Sakhalin LNG move". LNG Prime. Retrieved 2022-07-05.
- ↑ "Постановление Правительства Российской Федерации от 02.08.2022 г. № 1369". government.ru (in русский). Retrieved 2023-06-27.
- ↑ "Russia Orders New Sakhalin-2 Operator to Be Set Up in Far East". Bloomberg.com. Retrieved 2023-06-27.
- ↑ "Russia's Novatek to acquire Shell's stake in Sakhalin-2 for $1.16 bln". Reuters. Retrieved 2023-06-27.
- ↑ "Mitsui пока остается — Все новости о нефти и газе в России и Мире на oilcapital.ru" (in русский). Retrieved 2023-06-27.
- ↑ "Gazprom's unit buys former Shell stake in Sakhalin Energy for $1 bln". Nasdaq. Mar 26, 2024. Retrieved Apr 15, 2024.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ "Arctic Will Make Novatek Biggest LNG Exporter," The Maritime Executive, Jun. 30, 2017
- ↑ "«Сахалинская энергия» в 2024 году отгрузила из порта Пригородное около 10,2 млн тонн СПГ". portnews.ru. April 1, 2025. Retrieved June 3, 2025.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ 36.0 36.1 "2017 World LNG Report" International Gas Union, Accessed June 20, 2017.
- ↑ Russia's Putin seeks to woo Shell back to LNG projects, BNE Intellinews, Jul. 19, 2019
- ↑ "Стоимость третьей очереди "Сахалина-2" оценили в $6,1 млрд". Interfax.ru. Sept 24, 2019. Retrieved May 6, 2024.
{{cite web}}: Check date values in:|date=(help)CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ Russia's Sakhalin-2 LNG plant's expansion put on hold – sources, Reuters, Nov. 1, 2019
- ↑ "Третья очередь «Сахалина-2» находится в проработке, Д.Хандога". AK&M. May 20, 2021. Retrieved May 6, 2024.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ "Крупнотоннажные заводы по производству сжиженного газа в России будут работать на отечественном оборудовании". Rg.ru. July 4, 2023. Retrieved May 8, 2024.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ ""Сахалинская энергия" сохраняет планы по строительству третьей линии завода СПГ". www.finmarket.ru. October 2, 202. Retrieved June 3, 2025.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ "Энергетическая стратегия Российской Федерации на период до 2050 года" (PDF). Ministry of Energy of Russia. April 12, 2025. Retrieved May 28, 2025.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ 44.0 44.1 44.2 44.3 Muttitt, Greg; PLATFORM (2005). "Sakhalin II gas and oil project - Further Breaches of Equator Principles".
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link) - ↑ "Oil spill on Sakhalin Island shows serious risk of oil and gas development in the area". Retrieved 2023-06-27.
- ↑ 46.0 46.1 "Indigenous Peoples in Sakhalin, Russia, campaign against oil extraction, 2005-2007 | Global Nonviolent Action Database". nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu. Retrieved 2023-06-27.
- ↑ Tanya Mosolova. "Sakhalin-2 pipeline construction work suspended". U.S. Retrieved 2023-06-27.
