Energy profile: Venezuela

From Global Energy Monitor
This page is part of Global Energy Monitor's Latin America Energy Portal.
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Fuel mix (fossil fuels vs renewables)

Venezuela's transportation and industrial sectors rely heavily on domestic production of fossil fuels, with oil and natural gas comprising approximately 78% of the country's total energy supply in 2024[1] (down from 91% in 2020).[2] Hydro power plays a dominant role in electricity generation, accounting for 58.82% of installed capacity[1] and approximately 90% of generation in 2024.[1][3]

In 2024, Venezuela generated 8.86% of its electricity from fossil fuels and 91.14% from non-fossil sources. The breakdown was as follows:[3]

  • 91.10% hydro
  • 4.49% gas
  • 4.37% other fossil fuels
  • 0.03% wind
  • 0.01% solar

As of 2024, fossil fuels accounted for 40.70% of Venezuela's installed electrical capacity, with non-fossil energy sources making up the remaining 59.30%, as detailed below:[4]

  • 58.82% hydro
  • 40.70% fossil fuels
  • 0.24% wind
  • 0.16% bioenergy
  • 0.08% solar

Venezuela's most recent national electricity plan, PDSEN 2022-2025 (Plan de Desarrollo del Sistema Eléctrico Nacional) has called for other renewable energy sources (wind and solar) to be incorporated in the country's long term strategies, particularly for rural communities[5], but progress has been negligible.

Greenhouse gas emissions targets

Venezuela’s Second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for 2025–2030, submitted to the UNFCCC on October 28, 2025, committed the country to reducing greenhouse-gas emissions by 20% by 2030 relative to its baseline scenario. To support this target, the NDC outlined more than $18.4 billion in mitigation investment, including approximately $7.8 billion in the electricity sector and $10 billion in transport; in particular, Venezuela planned to convert seven oil-fired power plants totaling about 3.8 GW to natural gas, including the 2.6-GW Planta Centro, and develop 5.5 GW of renewable generation, comprising at least 3 GW of solar and 1 GW of wind. It also targeted a 71% reduction in gas flaring between 2025 and 2030, supported by development of gas-transport infrastructure, while transport investment was expected to focus heavily on metro and rail systems.[6]

Government energy agencies & other key players

National energy ministry

MinPet (Ministerio del Poder Popular de Petróleo) oversees all activities involving hydrocarbon and non-renewable energy resources.[7]

Permitting agencies

The Ministry of Oil, PDVSA, National Executive, National Assembly, and other State agencies are responsible for permitting, licensing, and joint-venture agreements.[8]

Regulatory agencies

Regulation of the oil industry is handled by the Hydrocarbons Act, while the gas industry is regulated by the Gas Act.[8]

Electric utilities

Corpoelec (Corporación Eléctrica Nacional) is the state power company in Venezuela, under the Ministry of Electric Power formed in 2007 following the merger of ten state-owned and six privately-owned electrical companies.[9]

National oil company

PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.) is the state company which explores, produces, refines, transports, stores, manufactures, and commercializes petroleum products within and outside of Venezuela.[10] The company was put under military control in 2018.[11]

Other energy-related companies

Carbozulia is the state-owned coal company.[12] INGESOL CA and Solinal CA are the main companies in the solar energy market in Venezuela.[13]

Electricity in Venezuela

Blackouts and other problems associated with Venezuela's decaying electrical infrastructure

The electricity crisis in Venezuela is an ongoing socio-economic catastrophe that has left millions of citizens in darkness for over a decade.[14] The history of the crisis began shortly after President Hugo Chávez nationalized the electrical grid in 2008, which was followed by a blackout affecting ten states that same year.[14] This led to a declaration of an "electricity emergency" in 2010, subsequent mega-blackouts in 2011, and major grid collapses in 2013 and 2014 that left up to 75% of the population without power.[14] A second emergency was declared by President Nicolás Maduro in 2016, implementing strict rationing plans, followed by substation explosions in Zulia in 2018 and a massive blackout affecting Zulia and 15 other states.[14] The crisis reached its peak during a historic nationwide blackout in March 2019 that plunged the country into darkness for five days, paralyzing water and gas services and causing 21 deaths.[14] More recently, an August 2024 blackout impacted 20 regions,[14] while in March 2025 the regime slashed public sector workdays to 4.5 hours to cope with ongoing shortfalls.[15]

The official government discourse attributes these failures to an "environmental emergency" driven by climate change and droughts that lowered water levels in Andean reservoirs, or to "electrical sabotage."[14][15] However, experts, technicians, and critics argue the true causes are systemic corruption, neglect, and a complete lack of investment in the grid.[15][16] This has led to the loss of more than 60% of Venezuela's installed capacity since 2013, leaving backup thermoelectric power plants—such as Planta Centro, Tacoa, Ezequiel Zamora, La Cabrera, La Raísa, Termocentro-El Sitio, and Termozulia—inoperative or severely diminished,[15][16] and starving key infrastructure like the Central Hidroeléctrica de Guri—which generates about 70% of the country's electricity—of necessary maintenance.[15] Additional structural causes include a massive exodus of specialized personnel, lack of spare parts, equipment theft, and neglected power line corridors.[15] The impact of the collapse is highly unequal: while Caracas is mostly spared, states like Zulia, Táchira, Mérida, and Barinas suffer up to eight hours of daily rationing, crippling private commerce, industries, and healthcare services.[15]

Installed capacity

Venezuela's installed electrical capacity totals just over 30 GW, split roughly equally between fossil fuels and hydropower.[2] The country's largest single power generator is the Guri hydroelectric project (also known as the Simon Bolivar hydroelectric project), with an installed capacity of 10,235 MW.[17]

Production

As of April 2022, Venezuela's electrical grid was said to be operating at 20% of capacity, with actual generation running 6 GW to 10 GW short of the country's needs, and an estimated investment of US$12 to 15 billion required to restore the system to normal operating conditions.[18] Venezuela's power plants and electrical grid are plagued by maintenance issues that severely reduce available capacity, and the country is prone to regular blackouts, including the notorious March 2019 blackout that impacted the entire nation.[17][19][20][21][22][23] As of March 2022, daily blackouts of up to nine hours were reportedly affecting several of Venezuela's western states, including Zulia, home to Venezuela's second largest city, Maracaibo.[24]

Latest estimates show Venezuela generating between 109 and 133 TWh of electricity annually[2][25], with 62% coming from hydropower and the remaining 38% from hydrocarbon power plants.[2][8]

Demand

Total Energy Consumption in Venezuela 1990-2019, Source: Enerdata

The majority of Venezuela's electrical demand is met by the Simon Bolivar Hydroelectric Plant.[9] However, a fall in production in recent years means that Venezuela is not meeting the demand of its population.[8]

Consumption

Electricity consumption in Venezuela has dropped steadily since 2013 due to economic and political turmoil, population exodus, and crumbling infrastructure.[26]

Coal in Venezuela

Domestic Production

Source: Worldometers

Venezuela has an abundance of coal - with the third largest reserves in Latin America- on which it has begun to rely more heavily due to US oil sanctions.[12] Increasing coal production is the State strategy to mitigate the economic damage caused by lost oil revenues.[12]

Consumption

As of 2016, Venezuela had proven coal reserves equivalent to 4,460 times the annual consumption. The country consumes approximately 180,696 short tons annually.[27]

Imports & source countries

Venezuela does not import notable amounts of coal, particularly since the economic crisis began.[27]

Transport

Venezuela exports coal primarily to European nations for a total of 310,000 tons during 2019.[12] Britain was one of the destinations for Venezuelan coal in 2019 and 2020 after receiving no Venezuelan coal during 2018.[12]

Oil & Natural Gas in Venezuela

The Venezuelan oil industry: history and general context

Venezuela holds approximately 17% of the world's proven crude oil reserves,[28] estimated at more than 300 billion barrels.[29] Commercial development began in 1922 around Lake Maracaibo. Over the following decade, foreign companies — led by Gulf, Shell, and Standard Oil[30] — took control of the country's burgeoning oil market. Operations later expanded into the Orinoco Belt,[31] home to Venezuela's most important oil deposits, spanning the Carabobo, Ayacucho, Junín, and Boyacá areas.

Production peaked in the 1970s at around 3.5 million barrels per day.[32] Venezuela nationalized its oil industry for the first time in 1976.[33] A new phase of nationalization began in 2007,[34] when the state oil company PDVSA took majority control of the major oil projects in the Orinoco Belt.[35]

Production declined sharply[32] between 2015 and 2020, and remained below one million barrels per day for most of the next five years.[36] As of January 2026, Venezuela was estimated to account for less than 1% of global oil exports.[37]

United States' January 2026 intervention and implications for Venezuela's oil industry

In early January 2026, the United States carried out a military operation in Venezuela that resulted in the capture and removal of President Nicolás Maduro, after which Vice President Delcy Rodríguez assumed the presidency on an interim basis and the Trump administration announced that it would work with the new government to revive Venezuela's oil industry.[38] The intervention fundamentally altered the political and economic environment for the energy sector: Washington began easing restrictions on Venezuelan oil transactions, while the Rodríguez government moved rapidly to dismantle elements of the state-dominated model established under Hugo Chávez.[39]

Venezuela's 2026 hydrocarbons law

Venezuela’s reformed Organic Hydrocarbons Law, promulgated on January 29, 2026[40][41], significantly opened the upstream sector to private and foreign investment[42] while retaining state ownership of hydrocarbon resources and a central role for Venezuela's national oil company PDVSA. The reform created Production Participation Contracts (CPPs) and other contracts allowing private operators to directly manage primary activities—including exploration and production—at their own cost and risk, with compensation potentially consisting of a percentage of production for the operator to commercialize directly[43]; it also expanded the powers of private minority partners in existing mixed companies[44], permitted local and international arbitration, and simplified the sector's fiscal regime.[43] The law retained a royalty of up to 30%, but allowed the government to reduce it when necessary to make economically marginal projects viable, including reductions to 20% for private operators under certain contracts and 15% for mixed companies.[43] Overall, the reform represented a major shift away from Venezuela's traditionally state-dominated model toward greater private operational and commercial autonomy and stronger investor protections, while preserving state ownership and regulatory authority.

Deals and development plans announced after the United States' 2026 intervention

In January 2026, Chevron announced to investors that it saw the potential to grow its Venezuelan production volumes by up to 50% over the next 18 to 24 months.[45] Three months later, Chevron confirmed more specific plans to expand its Venezuelan operations. In an April 2026 press release, Chevron announced an asset swap with PDVSA that expanded its position in Venezuela’s heavy-oil sector, increasing its Petroindependencia stake to 49% and giving its Petropiar venture rights to develop the adjacent Ayacucho 8 area in the Orinoco Oil Belt, where Chevron was already developing the Hamaca and Huyapari fields.[46]

In February 2026, Shell reaffirmed plans to develop its existing stake in the offshore Dragón and Loran-Manatee gas fields (shared between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago).[47] In early March, following a March 2026 meeting with Delcy Rodríguez, Shell announced a new agreement with the Venezuelan government to develop the onshore Carito and Pirital production units in the Punta de Mata division (Monagas state).[48][49]

In February 2026, BP announced that it was seeking a license from the US government to move ahead with development of the offshore Manakin-Cocuina field.[50] BP subsequently signed an MoU with the Venezuelan government in April 2026 formalizing the launch of gas development at Manakin-Cocuina.[51][52]

In late August 2026, the United States government and Venezuelan interim authorities announced a sweeping bilateral energy agreement to develop 17 strategic oil fields in Venezuela's Orinoco Belt and Lake Maracaibo regions, which were reported to hold 65 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves.[53][54] Facilitated by Venezuelan businessman Alejandro Betancourt López, the transaction granted his privately held parent firm, North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP), 100-year concessions to operate these fields.[55][56] The proposed 25-year binational project targeted a long-term production goal of over 1.5 million barrels per day and included commitments from NABEP to invest up to $100 billion in new oil infrastructure, which was projected to generate between $200 billion and $209 billion in state royalties and taxes over the first 25 years.[53][55][57] Structurally, the deal established a private joint venture where the U.S. government would hold majority control over 55% of the effective output, combining a 35% passive equity stake for the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Capital (acquired via penny warrants) with a guaranteed right for the State Department to purchase 20% of the output at cost and a right of first refusal on the remaining 80%.[55][58] By design, the accord displaces Russian and Chinese state-backed interests by assigning 14 newly granted concessions previously run by foreign operators—including five run by Chinese companies (Sinopec, CNPC, and the sanctioned China Concord Resources) and one by a Russian firm—redirecting heavy crude flows directly to U.S. Gulf Coast refiners.[55][59] These developments occur alongside active controversies involving Alejandro Betancourt López, who has faced active money-laundering investigations in Spain and Switzerland over $4.85 billion allegedly siphoned from PDVSA, as well as allegations of receiving inflated, no-bid power plant contracts during Venezuela's 2009–2011 electricity crisis.[56][57][60]

Separately, on September 2, 2026, Chevron Corporation announced finalized agreements with Venezuela establishing updated fiscal, commercial, and legal terms to support plans to invest over $7 billion over the next five years, aiming to more than double its production in the country to approximately 600,000 barrels per day.[61] Under these updated terms, Chevron’s Petroindependencia, S.A. joint venture (in which Chevron holds a 49% interest) was assigned rights to develop the adjacent Carabobo 1 and Carabobo-2-South-A greenfield areas in the Orinoco Belt, expanding its extra-heavy oil footprint.[61] This follows an April 2026 agreement that gave Petroindependencia development rights for the Ayacucho 8 area adjacent to the Petropiar, S.A. joint venture, and is complemented by Chevron’s western Petroboscan, S.A. operations in Zulia State.[61] Chevron is also seeking to negotiate operating rights for an area in Monagas North to secure light crude diluents necessary to process its extra-heavy output.[62] While Chevron intends to scale operations within five years, energy experts caution that due to severely decayed infrastructure, high production costs, and political risk, actual commercial production increases across Venezuela will take between five and 15 years to materialize.[63][64] Crucially, the exact estimated reserves for Chevron’s newly assigned fields (Carabobo 1, Carabobo-2-South-A, and Ayacucho 8) were not disclosed, though the company highlighted that the region's overall deep resource potential underpins its long-term investment strategy.[61]

Obstacles to reviving Venezuela's oil industry

In the immediate aftermath of the US intervention, there was much speculation about the prospects for reviving Venezuela's oil and gas industry and its associated infrastructure. Companies considering re-engagement with Venezuela were reportedly weighing the potential economic benefits against concerns about security[65] political instability[66], and the massive deterioration of Venezuela's existing oil infrastructure[67] due to a lack of investment and poor maintenance. Oil quality was seen as another potential obstacle to investor interest: Venezuelan crude is heavy, requiring more complex and costly processing.[68] Finally, there have been questions about whether global demand will be sufficient to support large-scale new investment.[69] Experts immediately pointed out that considerable cost and time would be required[70] to restart the industry: returning production to previous levels could take between five and fifteen years, with estimated expenditures ranging from US$80 billion[71] to US$183 billion.[72]

Climate and environmental impacts associated with increased Venezuelan oil development

Venezuela's dirty, extra-heavy crude has a higher carbon content[73] than conventional crude and requires energy-intensive processing; its expanded development could sharply increase global greenhouse gas emissions.[74] Venezuela's current flaring intensity[75] is among the highest in the world, resulting in very high GHG emissions.[76]

Commercializing gas that is currently flared and vented could create a different kind of "carbon bomb," releasing enormous gas reserves just as the world needs to move away from new oil and gas infrastructure. Offshore development raises the possibility of a major oil spill, which could have disastrous consequences for the entire Caribbean region, according to a 2021 report focused on neighboring Guyana.[77]

Venezuela's weak regulatory environment[78] results in minimal accountability for environmental abuses, while a lack of transparency[79] makes it difficult to accurately assess the oil industry's environmental impact.

Domestic Production

As of 2019, despite having the largest oil reserves of any country in Latin America and the Caribbean, Venezuela slipped from third to fourth place among the region's oil producers (after Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia).[80] Declining oil and gas production in Venezuela has corresponded with political turmoil in the country and worsened during 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Venezuela was a founding member of OPEC and has some of the largest oil reserves in the world, but corruption, mismanagement, lack of investment, obsolescent machinery, and lack of qualified personnel have squandered Venezuela's resources and greatly diminished the country's power in the marketplace.[8][81]

Source: OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report November 2021 and U.S. EIA
Source: OPEC

As of November 2021, domestic oil production targets in Venezuela set by the national oil company PDVSA were 1 million barrels per day by the end of the year, despite geopolitical turmoil.[82] The production recovery was being pushed by President Nicolas Maduro and contractors were said to be receiving payment in scrap metal or backpacks full of US dollars according to a December 2021 Bloomberg report.[83] A recent initiative to privatize PDVSA has provoked allegations of corruption and concerns about the government's lack of transparency.[84]

Consumption

Domestic consumption of oil and gas in Venezuela is hindered by poor distribution, lack of product, and inflation.[8]

Exports

Venezuela's oil exports have steadily fallen in recent years due to declining production and US government sanctions. Most of Venezuela's current exports are shipped to China, Russia and European companies such as Eni and Repsol in the form of loan repayments.[85][86] Despite ongoing sanctions against Venezuela, the US government has allowed shipments to Eni and Repsol to continue to help reduce Europe's dependence on Russian oil.[87]

Reserves

Venezuela's oil reserves, estimated at 302.3 billion barrels in 2019, are by far the largest of any country in Latin America and the Caribbean.[80] Venezuela also has nearly 70% of the region's natural gas reserves.[88]

Proposed new sources & projects

New gas projects in Venezuela have been slowed by the economic and political crisis within the country, a situation that has been further exacerbated by US sanctions.[8] During 2021, the Maduro government hoped the new Anti-Blockade Law would attract foreign capital so that 70 oil fields could be developed that would otherwise have remained inactive.[89] As of 2021, the Hydrocarbons Act of 2006 was still in place, requiring that primary oil exploration and production be carried out by the State or entities more than 50% owned by the State, and thus greatly limiting new contracts and explorations.[8]

Renewable Energy in Venezuela

Hydropower and domestic fossil fuels have long been prioritized over non-conventional renewables, and much of Venezuela's electrical transmission infrastructure is abandoned or in decay due to the national economic crisis. As a result, new wind and solar projects have struggled to gain a foothold; the La Guajira wind farm is a case in point.[90] A lack of government policy support has also impeded the potential of small-scale distributed solar.[91]

Experts have highlighted Venezuela's critical need to develop alternative clean energy sources to mitigate the risks of excessive reliance on the Guri hydroelectric plant—which has historically provided between 70% and 80% of the country's electricity.[92][93][1] The decrease in the cost of renewable installation, particularly solar, should theoretically make renewables a more viable option for Venezuela.[13] The use of renewable energy in remote areas would also help alleviate the risk of blackouts common to much of the country.[94] As of 2024, however, wind and solar power were practically non-existent in Venezuela's national energy mix, contributing less than 100 megawatts (MW) of combined capacity, and accounting for a mere 0.27% of Venezuela's total electrical generation in 2024.[1]

The peninsulas of Paraguaná and La Guajira possess immense wind energy potential.[92] In 2012 Venezuela's electrical energy minister Alí Rodríguez Araque proposed ambitious wind projects designed to generate up to 10,000 MW in La Guajira alone.[95] However, the pilot Paraguaná and La Guajira wind farms were left completely unfinished, with no continuity strategy.[92] According to energy analysts, while utilizing the renewable energy potential of Paraguaná and La Guajira is crucial for long-term grid diversification and to replace generation shortfalls from the Guri hydro plant, but the country must first carry out massive investments to repair and maintain its existing, highly deteriorated electrical infrastructure before alternative energies can be successfully integrated.[92]

In June 2021, Venezuela connected its first solar PV system at the Sombrero II substation in Guárico state[96][97], a small-scale pilot project with a estimated capacity of only 0.1 MW.[98]

Iron & Steel in Venezuela

Venezuela's large state-run steelmaker Sidor, in decline since its nationalization in 2008[99][100] and long unable to produce anywhere near total capacity due to dilapidated machinery[101], ceased operations permanently after the Venezuelan blackout of March 2019.[102][103] The plant produced less than 1% of its total capacity in 2020.[104] Oxygen from Sidor facilities - previously used as an input during the steel production process - was repurposed during 2020 and 2021 to treat COVID-19 patients.[104] Venezuela's iron ore deposits are of high quality, but a 2009 deal to develop them with Chinese investment created massive debt for the Venezuelan government due to extremely low prices and Venezuela's inability to meet its contractual obligations. Iron ore production by state-run mining company CVG Ferrominera Orinoco has fallen precipitously over the past decade.[105]

Environmental & social impacts of energy in Venezuela

Crude oil leaks visible on a NASA satellite from September 2021 on Lake Maracaibo. Source: NASA

The Venezuelan government frequently covers up the true social and environmental impacts of energy and mining projects,[106] but despite these attempts reports are still able to ascertain corruption, human rights violations, environmental contamination, release of greenhouse gases, deforestation, pollution of potable water reservoirs, and more.[107] As Venezuela's environmental institutions have collapsed due to government corruption there has been a chain reaction of unsustainable natural resource extraction.[108] Mining projects are able to operate without environmental impact assessments or public consultations.[107] Oil spills are frequent occurrences and are likely to continue without adequate funding to update and maintain pipelines, wells, floating terminals, and other necessary infrastructure.[17] The risk of environmental disaster has intensified with the decline of the Venezuelan economy, as evidenced by continued reports of abandoned oil wells, ruptured pipelines, spills and gas leaks, and the stranding of a rusty tanker loaded with more than a million barrels of crude oil off Venezuela's coast in 2020.[109][110][111][112] Between January-September 2021 there were 53 oil spills, primarily along the Caribbean coast.[106]

References

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